Abstract-In this paper we apply Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to the task of automatic threat detection, specifically conventional explosives, in security X-ray scans of passenger baggage. We present the first results of utilizing CNNs for explosives detection, and introduce a dataset, the Passenger Baggage Object Database (PBOD), which can be used by researchers to develop new threat detection algorithms. Using state-of-the-art CNN models and taking advantage of the properties of the Xray scanner, we achieve reliable detection of threats, with the best model achieving an AUC of the ROC of 0.95. We also explore heatmaps as a visualization of the location of the threat.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have recently made impressive gains in image recognition, made possible by publicly available datasets and GPU-enabled computing systems. Since AlexNet in 2012 [8] , many new architectures and principles have been developed, improving performance as well as understanding of these models.
We select a subset of state of the art CNNs and apply them to two dimensional x-ray images in order to identify explosives. As far as we are aware, this is the first publication to present results on detecting explosives in x-ray images using CNNs. The closest related work is Akçay et al. [1] , which explores CNNs for detection of weapons such as guns. Suffice it to say, detecting explosives is a major concern and task for transportation agencies around the world, and in particular for aviation. Airplanes continue to be a target of terrorist activities and plots. However, research and progress in detecting explosives have been hampered by a lack of data. In the United States, for example, a handful of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) create the hardware that is used in U.S. airports today. While airports generate thousands of images each day, none of those images are available outside of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Also, even if stream of commerce data was available to researchers, the vast majority of the images do not contain explosives or other threats. OEMs can create datasets with threats because they have the hardware at their disposal. Thus, the only option to develop automatic threat recognition algorithms(ATRs) are the OEMs. Third parties do not have access to the images or the hardware.
To rectify that, we are creating the Passenger Baggage Object Database (PBOD). This database will eventually contain images from all of the major explosive threat categories, from conventional explosives, to improvised homemade explosives (HME). For now, our data set has just one type of explosive.
Some important caveats: we utilized a Rapiscan 620DV system, but we are unaware of what the detection performance is for Rapiscan's native threat algorithms. Any results presented herein are derived solely from our own approach applied to the data set we created. We discuss a variety of metrics such as AUC, false positive and false negative rates; however, these only apply to our dataset, and we do not know how well the algorithm would work in an operational context. Also, we do not discuss the type of explosive or the mass of the explosives utilized in the data set.
A question that comes up when using deep learning and CNNs is how much data is enough? Image datasets like ImageNet [4] have millions of images, and the size of the today's image datasets is a large reason why CNNs have been effective. Neural networks with hundreds of millions of weights need large amounts of data to train all the parameters and avoid overfitting. The dataset we evaluate in this paper has the following characteristics:
• Scans were performed on a Rapiscan dual-view system, so each scan has two images, a top and side view.
• There are 4760 scans (9520 images).
• There are 1960 scans with threats (3920 images, 41% of total).
• There are 2800 scans with no threats (5600 images, 59% of total). While we can't answer definitively how many scans are enough, we do see improved accuracy as we increase the number the number of images, which will be discussed in more detail in Section IV-B.
To summarize, our main contributions are the following: 1) We provide the first study of CNNs applied to detecting explosives in x-ray images. We believe these initial findings are promising, with the best model scoring an AUC of the ROC of 0.95. We also present results of finding the location of the threat within the image. 2) We present the first non-proprietary dataset that can be used by researchers to study explosives in x-ray images. While the dataset cannot be released to the general public because of security concerns, PBOD can be requested and delivered to those with the proper credentials to handle the data. 3) We also present empirical results on the number and types of images needed for training CNNs to obtain the best classifier performance. We describe the data in Section II, including strategies for data augmentation and steps needed to avoid contamination between training and testing. We discuss the models we selected in Section III. In Section IV we present the results of applying the models to detecting threats. In Section V, we use heatmaps to determine the location of threats within an image. We conclude in Section VI.
II. DATA
In this section we discuss the nature of the data. X-ray images pose a significant challenge because of multiple objects overlapping each other. Clutter can attenuate the x-rays going through the threat object, altering the signature.
A. Data Description
The system we used to collect the images was a Rapiscan 620DV. It is a dual-view, dual-energy screening solution. Dualview indicates that two views of the scanned object are created, a top view and a side view. Dual-energy indicates that two energy levels are collected at each pixel in the detector, binned into high-energy x-rays and low-energy x-rays. These two channels are then converted into two numbers, the intensity, represented by a 16-bit integer, and the Z-effective, represented by an 8-bit integer. The intensity measures how many x-rays reached the detector. Air allows practically all x-rays to reach the detector, so the intensity is high. Dense objects block or attenuate the x-rays, so the intensity decreases as density increases. The Z-effective is an estimate on the effective atomic number of the material. Having two energy bins allows for the the Z-effective calculation. We do not go into details here as it is beyond the scope of this paper, but Sakata et al. [11] present some recent results on one method.
Instead of red, green, and blue channels like in standard images, the x-ray scans have just two channels. Since we use deep learning models that were designed for images with three channels, we map the intensity to red, Z-effective to green, and leave blue as zero (we have no knowledge of the native Rapiscan color schema relating to specific densities and intensities). Two images using this mapping are shown in Figures 1 and 2 . In these images (and later ones), for display purposes, the intensity values have been inverted so that black represents high intensities and high red values represent low intensities.
Scan data coming from the Rapiscan system is in a proprietary format initially. We convert this proprietary format to the Digital Imaging and Communications in Security (DICOS) [6] file format. DICOS is a standard that builds upon the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine standard (DICOM) [5] , which is popular in the medical imaging community as a file format and transfer mechanism for medical imaging files. While the tools available for manipulating DICOS images are limited, since DICOS and DICOM share so many features, many DICOM toolsets interoperate with DICOS files. In particular we used Pydicom [9] . The hope is that using a standard file format common to x-ray imaging will facilitate adoption and exploration of PBOD. However, it is unfortunately the case that DICOS/DICOM have not kept pace with technological developments. There is no standard way to place Z-effective data in a DICOS/DICOM file. As such, a custom tag was employed to include the Z-effective in each file.
B. Data Preparation and Processing
We performed preprocessing steps on the data before training and testing of the CNN models. The x-ray images come in varying sizes, which is largely depenedent on the size of the scanned bag. While not impossible to design a network with variable-sized inputs, it is simply easier to ensure that all images are of the same size. Also, since we are using existing CNN models, and most of those models have specific requirements on the input size (depending on whether or not we keep the fully connected layer of the model), we picked an image size that would work with all of the models, which was 299x299.
We found that by simply resizing the x-ray images by scaling and not preserving the aspect ratio produced subpar results. However, the following simple method was sufficient for our needs. We switched to a cropping approach that maintains the aspect ratio, and keeps the relevant part of the image. First, we trim off as much of the background as possible, by finding all pixels where the Z-effective value is above 0. While the intensity channel was very noisy, we found that the Z-effective values were consistently above 0 in regions where objects were actually located. We take a bounding box using the min and max coordinates of the selected pixels, and grab this region from the image. This region is then padded on its shorter axis to make a square image, and then downsampled to the desired size of 299x299. Switching from naive scaling to this cropping method improved accuracy by around 20%. Fig. 3 shows a scan before and after applying this cropping algorithm.
Because the two channels do not have the same magnitude and scale, the data is also normalized by dividing the values in each channel by the maximum possible value of that channel so that each channel has a range of 0 to 1.
C. Image Duplication and Implications
As in all machine learning, it is important to train on one data set and evaluate on another in order to garner the models ability to generalize. One approach to approximating generalization accuracy is cross-validation. In k-fold cross validation, the data is partitioned into k equal sized subsamples, and training occurs k times, where with each iteration one of the k subsamples is held out as a validation set. However, we needed to modify this technique for PBOD. In order to determine the trained models' ability to generalize to unseen data, it is vital that the training and validation sets have no overlap. Because of the way PBOD was collected, there is a lot of redundancy, i.e. there are a lot of very similar images. Each of the bags was packed with a certain set of clutter, and then run multiple times through the scanner, in different orientations. This was done because both clutter items and threats can look significantly different from different angles, especially with occlusion. However, the results of Section IV-B shows that the extra scans per bag do not contribute much to overall performance.
Because of the redundancy in the dataset, the normal procedure of partitioning data via k randomly selected subsets would create contamination between the sets. This contamination leads to an inflated accuracy on the validation set, because the model is tested on images very similar to ones it trained on. To overcome this characteristic of our specific dataset, we grouped our data into sets that would contain all scans of a particular bag configuration and partitioned the data by those sets instead of per scan. We grouped the images first by the day that the scans where taken (see Section IV-A), and then also by packing ID (see Section IV-B), which is a unique identifier for each bag and item configuration.
A consequence of the multiple scans per packing ID is that some subclasses are underrepresented. While all of the data we gathered was for one type of explosive, the threat has different modalities, with one day's worth of scans usually being dedicated to obtaining images for one modality. If two days are dedicated to one modality, with about 50 scans collected per day, the actual number of unique scans over the two days is closer to 12 or 25 rather than a hundred. This comes from the fact that most packings were scanned four or eight times, as can be seen in Figure 5 . Later, in Section IV-B we show that the extra scans per packing does not help improve accuracy. If the threat modality is particularly unique, with characteristics of the image sufficiently different from the other modalities, then 12-25 images is likely insufficient for the model to learn the concept. We will see this is the case for some modalities in Section IV-A.
III. MODELS
In this section we discuss the CNN models we selected to evaluate. We used three different prebuilt CNNs: VGG19 [12] , Xception [2] , and InceptionV3 [13] . We use the implementation of these models provided by Keras [3] .
Each model has a 'top': the last stages of the network that prepares the data coming from the earlier convolutional layers for the final classification. We do not include the top defined by Keras, but instead define our own. For Xception and InceptionV3, we define the top as a 2D global average pooling layer, followed by a fully-connected layer with 1024 nodes, a fully-connected layer with 2 nodes (threat and nonthreat), and then the soft-max function, which is similar to the approach used in [2] , [13] . For VGG19, we follow the architecture defined in [12] which has two fully-connected layers of size 4096, which are then followed by the fullyconnected layer of size 2 and the soft-max. We also created a hybrid VGG19 network (hvgg19), which uses the layout of VGG19 for the convolutional layers but top layers use Inception/Xception layout we defined above.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we discuss the various experiments we conducted to evaluate CNNs for automatic threat recognition of explosives in x-ray images. There are three experiments. In the first experiment we examine the binary classification problem of labeling each image as either a threat or nonthreat. In the second experiment we vary the number of images to determine if our dataset is sufficiently large. In the third experiment, we test utilizing only one of the two channels at a time.
As discussed in the previous section, we examined four different models: hvgg19, vgg19, xception, and inception. We tested two different initialization procedures, one where the weights were set to random values, and the other using transfer learning. In transfer learning, weights are initialized to values learned from training on a different dataset. The network is then trained on an application specific dataset. The idea is that the weights from the network trained on the other dataset extract general features which may carry over to the specific application. Akçay et al. [1] successfully applied transfer learning to the task of classifying objects and weapons in X-ray baggage imagery using AlexNet [8] pretrained on ImageNet data. We also use weights that were pretrained on ImageNet data.
For all of our experiments we used an NVIDIA DGX-1 [10] , a supercomputer designed for accelerating deep learning applications with powerful GPUs. CNNs are highly parallelizable so GPU acceleration can result in dramatically better performance compared to CPUs.
We also use common techniques for augmenting the training set using flips, rotations, shifts, and scaling. For this we use Keras's ImageDataGenerator class [3] . During each epoch of training, every image (in the training set) is randomly flipped horizontally or vertically, rotated 0 to 359 degrees, shifted horizontally or vertically by 0-9 pixels, and zoomed in or out by up to 10%, so that after N epochs, the model will have been trained on N slightly modified training sets. Additionally, all of our models were trained using the Adam optimizer [7] with a learning rate of 1e-5.
Since the Rapiscan 620DV provides two views per scan, we combine their results in the following experiments. In training, each image is considered separately, but in testing, we apply the model to both images and combine the scores by taking the image with the highest probability of being a threat as the final score. In general, this provided better classifier performance as it was often the case that the threat was easier to see in one view vs the other.
A. Binary Classification
In this first experiment, we do not address where in the image the threat exists, but tackle simply the binary problem of classifying images as threats versus non-threats. In total we have eight different model scenarios, the four different models with each having two different initialization procedures, random weights or using pretrained weights. Overall, we were able to obtain some promising performance with the best model obtaining an AUC of the ROC of 0.95, a false positive rate (classifying a non-threat image as a threat) of 0.06, and a false negative rate (classifying a threat as a nonthreat) of 0.24. We found that all of the models had difficulty with some of the threat modalities, which indicates the need for more data collection.
As discussed in Section II-C, we partitioned the data by the date of the scans, so that all the scans for one day would be together in either training, validation, or testing. In this first experiment we had trouble determining a good stopping criterion for training. We first tried separating into three sets: training, validation, and testing, and we would stop training once the loss on the validation set stopped decreasing (while waiting 25 epochs to see if the situation changed). However, we found that the distribution of images in the validation set was not reflective of the test set (in most of the partitions we tried), so often more training was warranted to garner better accuracy on the test set.
Also, loss does not appear to correlate to the AUC of the ROC (and other metrics). Our next approach was to create eight disjoint validation sets per run with about the same ratio of threat vs. non-threat as the overall data set. We again partitioned on days. Because the number of scans taken per day varied, the size of each of the eight disjoint sets ranged from 464 to 1008. We then trained from 50 to 300 epochs, in increments of 50, and tested against the validation set. In Figure 6 , we plot the loss reported after learning versus the AUC achieved on the validaton set. So for each model scenario, there are 6 * 8 data points. None of the models, starting either with pretrained weights or from scratch, display any strong corrleation between loss and accuracy, as can be seen from Table I .
We believe this lack of correlation to be an artifact of how the data was collected, and the lack of sufficient samples for individual threat modalities. For each cross-validation run, eight different validation sets are created, but these sets vary from run to run. In all we collected data from 384 randomly selected validation sets (eight model scenarios, six different iteration counts, and eight different sets per run). Looking at this data collectively, there were six days (out of 50), where the models had trouble classifying, with over 80% of the predictions being wrong. If the validation sets are created with one or more of these difficult days, then the AUC and other metrics suffer, resulting in a high variance across runs and poor correlation with loss.
While there may be some inherent lack of ability by the models to distinguish these particular subclasses of threats represented by the difficult days, we hypothesize that the situation could be ameloriated by augmenting PBOD with additional samples. Some threat modalities have on the order of tens of unique images, which is certainly insufficient.
Despite these difficulties, we were able to achieve some encouraging results. As can be seen in Table II , we were able to obtain an AUC of the ROC of 0.95 using the hvgg19 model. The false positive rate (Table III) ranges between 0.049 and 0.292. The false negative rate (Table IV) ranges between 0.134 and 0.463. The higher false negative rate reflects the difficulty the models had in identifying different modalities of the threat. 
B. Varying the Number of Images
An important question when using CNNs is how many images are necessary to learn the target objective. Today, it is not uncommon to have millions of images for computer vision tasks. For security x-ray images, while it might be possible to use stream of commerce images as non-threat examples, to obtain threat images one must undertake the labor-intesive task of creating those images. In this section we explore to what degree the number of images aids classification accuracy by the CNN.
As mentioned earlier in Section II-C, the overall process for data collection was to create a packing, which is a set of items (potentially including a threat object), together with an enclosure such as a bag or suitcase. This packing was then scanned multiple times from different angles. For the most part, packings were either scanned four or eight times, resulting in 8 or 16 images (because of the dual views).
In evaluating how the number of images affects classifier performance there are two dimensions to consider: the number unique packings and the number of scans per packing. In Figure 7 we show AUC as a function of the number of packings and the number of scans per pack. We used vgg19 as the model. As it has the most parameters, it is most likely to be sensitive to training set sizes.
We see a general increase in AUC as the number of packings is increased, though the difference from 400 to 500 may not be significant. Overall, there is a small increase as one increases the number of scans per pack. As a recommendation for future collection efforts in this area, more effort should be expended on creating diversity of packings, rather than collecting multiple views of the same packing.
C. Utility of Dual-Energy
We wanted to get a measurement on the utility of having two channels, dual energy, rather than just one. To do so, we trained the hvgg19 on both channels, on just intensity, and just on Z-effective. For each scenario we performed four iterations of 8-fold cross validation and averaged the AUC. Table V presents the results. Current results indicate that Z-effective by itself did slightly better than both channels together; however, given the high variance between runs, the difference may not be significant.
V. VISUALIZATION OF THREAT LOCATION
In this section we add the capability to detect the location of the threat. We implemented a techinque from Zeiler and Fergus [14] , where a portion of an input image is covered to see how the classification output changes. A square occluder is slid accross the input image. After each movement of the occluder, an image is created. These images with different portions occluded are all fed into the network, and the probabilistic output of the modified image being classified as a threat is recorded. In a new image, these outputs are then accumulated for the region which their corresponding occluder was located, creating a heatmap of probabilities. We invert the heatmap so that regions where the threat is likely to be located have a value closer to 1, and non-threat regions have a value closer to 0. Algorithm 1 describes the approach in greater detail. Note that in practice, all of the occluded images are generated first so that they can be fed into the model in batches instead of invidually to take advantge of parallelism.
Algorithm 1 Generate heatmap for a given image
This method allows us to see which parts of the image are being used to identify the threats. When the threat is completely occluded, the image should be classified as a nonthreat. Likewise, when none of the threat is occluded, the image should be classified as a threat. Using this method, we can judge how well a model has learned and generalized to our goal of detecting threats, or whether it is using unrelated objects in the bag or features to "cheat".
We used an occluder size of 64 × 64, which filled in the intensity channel with a value of 0.875 (the average background intensity in our dataset) and the Z-effective channel with a value of 0. We used a stride of 5 to reduce the number of occluded images that we would have to feed into our model. Equation 1 describes the number of occluded images required for an N × N image, a k × k occluder, and a stride s.
For our numbers, this ended up being 2304 occluded images per input image. With a stride of one, 55,696 images would have been required.
Visual analysis of the resulting heatmaps reveals that for some images, the single portion of the image where the threat is located is responsible for positive classification, and that some models seem to be much better than others. To quantitatively evaluate the accuracy of the heatmap, we compared them to ground truth binary images where the threat region is white, and the rest of the image is black. To make the comparison, a threshold is first applied the the heatmap to create a binary image where threat pixels are 1 and non-threat pixels are 0. Then, each pixel in the heatmap is compared to the corresponding pixel in the ground truth, and the number of true positives (both pixels are 1), true negatives (both pixels are 0), false positives (1 in heatmap, 0 in ground truth), and false negatives (0 in heatmap, 1 in ground truth) are recorded. With these measurements, a number of common binary classifier metrics can be applied. We tested our results by choosing thresholds that maximize each metric. The quality of the heatmap can then be measured by the maximum possible value of the metric acheivable by sliding the threshold from 0 to 1. We tested the following metrics: F1 score (F1), precision (PRE), Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC), Bookmaker informedness (BM), and markedness (MK). The steps of the evaluation algorithm are detailed in Algorithm 2. We also looked at other metrics such as accuracy and true positive rate, and found that these were poor measures because even if the heatmap was completely wrong, a high threshold could make the whole resulting image black which would result in a high accuracy (or a low threshold to make the whole image white, for true positive rate), because the threats usually only cover a small portion of the image. The other metrics are much better suited to this situation because they are less sensitive to class imbalance. Figure 8 shows a few example heatmaps thresholded to optimize each metric. Heatmaps that correctly locate the threat consistently score higher in all metrics compared to heatmaps that fail to locate the threat. We recorded the average maximum scores of each metric for 387 test images in Table VI .
From the results in Table VI , we found that the pretrained models were much better at locating threats compared to the non-pretrained versions. We suspect that the models trained from scratch may have overfit to these images and are using unrelated features and objects in the scans to identify the threat, especially because the image set used for these tests overlaps with the training set. This overlap may seem problematic, but an image that the network has trained on does not contain any information about where the threat is, so there is no advantage when compared to an image that hasn't been seen before. In fact, having images that the network has seen before is more likely to decrease performance if the network has overfit to remember the non-threat contents of the scan and uses those to make a classification. Ultimately, a network that has learned a better understanding of what a threat is will score better on these heatmaps. We noticed that having a BM score greater than 0.7 did a fairly good job of determining correctly located threats, so we included the percentage of heatmaps that met this value. The resulting percentage of correctly located threats seems to reasonably correlate with that of a cursory visual inspection. The best performing model for localization was XCP-P, which was able to locate the threat about 72.09%.
We also discovered that localization usually failed in a few isolated groups within the testing set. For instance, 30 of the test scans were of an empty bin with just a threat in it. We hypothesize that because our training data never has an empty bin without a threat in it, the network has learned to identify the empty bins themselves as threats. Another group of around 46 scans had a higher amount of clutter than usual, and as a result localization was poor. Fig. 9 : A heatmap which has been colormapped to RGB, so that the threat region is easily distinguishable.
There may be concern that we are using the groundtruth to determine a threshold value, however this is acceptable because the thresholding is merely a tool to facilitate evaluatation of localization quality. The heatmaps themselves are meant to be a visual guide for us to gain insight to which part of the image is responsible for a classification. Also, if the heatmaps are instead intended to be a tool for the human operator to locate the threat within a flagged scan, it acheives this purpose without a threshold being applied, because a human being can easily locate the region where the threat probability is higher simply through the heatmap's color (heatmaps can be colormapped so that the highest threat region is easily distinguishable, as seen in Fig. 9 ).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented promising results on utlizing convolutional neural networks for the identification of explosive threats in x-ray images. Using state of the art CNNs, we obtained an AUC of the ROC of 0.95 for the best model, the first published results on the topic. We also present for the first time a database of x-ray images that can be used by researchers to explore algorithm development for explosive threat detection. Finally, we presented initial results of identifying threat location using a sliding occluder and generating heatmaps.
